Rethinking Britain and the European Union:politicians, the media and public opinion reconsidered by Copeland, Paul & Copsey, Nathaniel
Rethinking	Britain	and	the	European	Union:	politicians,	the	media	and	
public	opinion	reconsidered	
	
Paul	Copeland		
School	of	Politics	and	International	Relations		
Queen	Mary	University	of	London		
Mile	End	Road		
London		
E1	4NS	
	
And		
	
Nathaniel	Copsey		
Politics	and	International	Relations		
Aston	University		
B4	7ET	
	
1	
	
Rethinking Britain and the European Union: politicians, the media and public 
opinion reconsidered1 
 
Introduction 
 
For more than 40 years since the British accession to the then Common Market in 
1973, the UK’s relationship with the European project could be characterised as 
fragile and sceptical. Following Wilson’s brief renegotiation in 1974, the UK’s 1975 
referendum produced a majority in favour of continued membership (67 per cent with 
a turnout of 65 per cent). Whilst the membership question was never fully dropped, a 
cross-party consensus existed, although both the Labour and Conservative parties 
contained Eurosceptic factions. The enduring fragile consensus was based on a form 
of economic integration that incurred neither large budgetary cost, nor led to an 
erosion of Britain’s sovereignty. This grudging cross-party consensus changed in 
January 2013. That month, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that if the 
Conservative party were to form the government after the 2015 general election, it 
would hold an ‘in-or-out’ referendum on the renegotiated terms of Britain’s 
membership before the end of 2017. It is worth briefly exploring the recent historical 
background to this change. 
 
From the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, EU-wide and UK-specific pressures to hold a 
referendum steadily increased. Cameron’s EU referendum promise can be seen as one 
instance of several EU-wide political trends that form part of a post-Maastricht shift 
across the EU from ‘permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009). Within the Member States decisions can no longer be legitimised by 
executives and legislatures alone. On EU matters the public demands a say through 
referendums (although the call for a UK referendum has as much to do with infighting 
within the Conservative Party). Mair (2007) argued that the depoliticisation of EU 
politics drove this dynamic. Where there is consensus between mainstream political 
parties on EU policies, opposition to the EU shifts towards questioning the 
fundamental principles of integration. The argument can be taken further: Kriesi et al. 
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argue that the shift in politics, parties and party systems across the EU is driven by 
structural competition between the winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 
2006, p. 921), of which the EU is a regional variant (Schmidt, 2003). 
 
Growing pressure to hold a referendum in the UK has been linked to the growth of 
Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon. The rapid growth of British 
Euroscepticism is best evidenced by the United Kingdom Independence Party’s 
(UKIP) topping the polls in the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections with more 
than 27 per cent of the popular vote. For Fontana and Parsons (2015) pressure for a 
referendum had been building in the Conservative Party since the early 1990s, as 
Euroscepticism became the default position for those who saw themselves as 
Thatcher’s heirs after her fall from power in 1990. The ‘mechanisms pointing to a 
“Brexit” referendum were largely in place’ by 2005 (Fontana and Parsons, 2015, p. 
102) because the Conservative party by then had a clear majority of Eurosceptics, 
often with deep connections to the constituency level. This shift in British politics 
extended beyond the Conservative party. Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair promised 
referendums on both Euro membership (which was never needed because the ‘five 
economic tests’ were not met) and the Constitutional treaty (which was negated by the 
French and Dutch rejection of it in 2005) (Oppermann, 2008). To prevent a 
reoccurrence, in 2011, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government 
passed a European Union Act that committed the UK to holding national referendums 
before consent could be given to any deeper European integration. In 2012, the same 
Coalition Government commissioned a ‘Balance of Competences Review’ to evaluate 
what the EU does and how it affects the UK. By the 2010 General Election, even the 
pro-European Liberal Democrats began to support the idea of an ‘in or out’ 
referendum on EU membership to coincide with the next major revision of the treaties 
(Glencross, 2015).  
 
Other scholars have pointed to the role of the UK media as key to understanding the 
rise of Euroscepticism. For Daddow (2012), increased Euroscepticism can be traced 
to Rupert Murdoch and News UK, while for Young (1999) and Forster (2002) the 
issue has its origins in the reporting of the right-wing press, which includes the 
publications of News UK. For Hawkins (2012: 562) the negative reporting of the EU 
in the UK is more problematic than in other EU Member States since the public is the 
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least well informed about EU developments. The existing literature suggests that  
newspapers and the voters who read them are divided between an indifferent cost–
benefit motivated majority for whom the European Union is a matter of rational 
choice on the one hand; and, a vocal minority element within society for whom 
almost anything to do with the European Union must be exclusively negative, on the 
other. 
 
This brief tour of the literature has set out some of the underlying driving forces that 
led to the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. But as Prosser (2016, p. 197) 
argues ‘further empirical investigation into the domestic political structures that drive 
the domestic politics of European integration is needed’. We take up this mantle with 
regard to just one factor: the role of the media as a vital intermediary between 
politicians and the public. In any national debate about membership of the EU, the 
media has a significant part to play in informing the public, as well as politicians and 
policy-makers, about the reasoned choices that need to be made and their 
consequences. And as Gavin (2000) points out, the media is where the public gets its 
information on EU affairs. In this article we describe and analyse how the ‘European 
issue’ has been reported in the British print media over the 40 years from the mid-
1970s to the mid-2010s. In doing so we provide a longitudinal empirical study that 
moves beyond the focus on Rupert Murdoch, the Eurosceptic press, and the political 
events of the early 1990s as being the determining factor in the EU debate within the 
UK. While each of these are necessary to understand the UK/EU debate, in isolation 
of each other they are insufficient and their individual significance could be 
overstated. For example, the UK press is an important component of the UK debate 
on the EU; but it is not the only determinant – public opinion and national politics are 
equally significant. We argue that the relationship between the media, national 
politics and public opinion is symbiotic and mutually dependent. We therefore begin 
our analysis of the ‘European issue’ in the UK from this assumption, rather than the 
supposition that one aspect of the relationship is the determinant of the other two. 
 
The paper investigates empirically whether the EU debate in the UK has succumbed 
to a structural bias in favour of Euroscepticism. In doing so, it provides empirical 
evidence that helps test the concept of ‘issue capture’ as a means of explaining the 
British debate on the EU that was put forward by Copsey and Haughton (2014). Issue-
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capture refers to the way in which a political issue of marginal interest to the 
mainstream can be captured and dominated by a minority group, with strongly held 
opinions, and for whom it has a particular salience (Copsey & Haughton, 2014, p. 
2014). The evidence gathered in our dataset explores this concept and supports the 
proposition that ‘issue capture’ has occurred. Central to the process is the absence of a 
pro-European faction within the British polity that is able to promote and defend the 
EU and to counter Eurosceptic rhetoric. We argue therefore that the growth of 
Euroscepticism in the UK is more likely to be the result of this general dynamic, 
rather than any single event or the agency of individuals, such as Margaret Thatcher 
or Rupert Murdoch.  
 
We proceed as follows. Section I briefly overviews the existing literature on the 
question of Britain’s media and the European issue. This exercise not only places our 
own work within the wider scholarly context, but it also allows us to explain how we 
arrived at our own research puzzle. Section II sets out the methodology with which a 
dataset of more than 16,400 press articles (1974–2013) covering the European issue 
was compiled.  This allows us to explore how British press coverage of the European 
issue has varied over time. The relationship between UK attitudes and the EU is 
dynamic in that its evolution does not reflect an unchanging, fixed EU; rather it 
reflects a process of European integration that is in a state of flux. Our focus here is 
on the particular angle that the journalist took (positive, negative, factual or neutral) 
and the magnitude of that position in positive and negative reporting (low, medium 
and high). Section III presents the findings of the dataset, which illustrate the areas of 
continuity and change in British coverage of the European issue over the 40 years 
between the mid-1970s and mid-2010s. In section IV, we contextualise the findings 
with data on public opinion and developments within UK national politics. In the 
conclusion, we reflect on the significance of our findings for the politics of Britain 
and the European Union.  
 
I. The Media, Public Opinion and Political Agenda-Setting 
 
In any national debate about membership of the European Union, the media has a 
significant part to play in informing the public, as well as politicians and policy-
makers, about the reasoned choices that need to be made and their consequences. 
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Over the 40 years since 1973, Daddow (2012) argues that UK media coverage on the 
EU moved from ‘permissive consensus to destructive dissent’. Daddow makes a 
powerful case that the UK media is characterised by ‘vigorously partisan hostility 
bordering on a nationalist and in some arenas xenophobic approach to coverage of 
European affairs’ (2012, p. 1219).  
 
The proximate cause of the decline in media neutrality for Daddow (2012) was 
identified in one person: the hugely successful media magnate Rupert Murdoch, 
proprietor of the Britain’s best-selling tabloid newspaper The Sun, as well as the more 
highbrow Times and Sunday Times, to say nothing of Sky News, Fox News and his 
international holdings. Murdoch’s personal instruction on editorial policy for 
coverage of the European issue is identified by Daddow (as well as Arsenault and 
Castells, 2008) as the direct source of negative coverage of European politics. 
Commercial gain, in other words, the bottom line of his News UK holding company, 
it is argued, forms the basis of Murdoch’s fervent anti-Europeanism. Murdoch, it is 
reasoned, feared the possible effects of anti-monopoly European competition policy 
regulation on his companies’ profitability. This prompted him to push for a strongly 
anti-European line in all his papers.  
 
Young (1999) and Forster (2002) point to the broader impact of the right-wing 
newspapers, particularly The Daily Telegraph and The Times, which, in the early 
1990s, began to align themselves with the Eurosceptic standpoint (with the latter 
owned by Murdoch since 1981). This coincided with a period of turbulence in both 
domestic politics and the UK–EU relationship. Not only did divisions over Europe 
within the Conservative Party contribute to the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, but 
the debate over the Maastricht Treaty caused serious long-term rifts within the 
Conservative party. At the same time as the Maastricht debate was taking placing in 
the UK and across Europe, Britain was also forced out of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in September 1992 (Geddes 2013), which in turn undermined both the 
Conservative party’s reputation for economic competence for nearly 20 years and the 
wider perception that membership of the EU was good for the UK economy. All of 
this points to the early 1990s as being a period in which Euroscepticism emerged fully 
and began to dominate the political landscape.     
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Hawkins’ 2012 study looked at press coverage of the Constitutional and Lisbon 
treaties and identifies a eurosceptic discourse that predominates in the British media 
and ‘dictates the terrain on which wider debates about the EU are conducted’ 
(Hawkins, 2012, p. 561). This is of crucial importance since earlier research has 
shown that media framing of European integration correlated with both higher levels 
of support (positive framing) and greater levels of cynicism and opposition (De 
Vreese, 2007; Vliengenthardt et al., 2008). This is particularly important in a setting 
where the public know little about the EU. The British public is the least well-
informed about the workings of the EU of any Member State. It is amongst this least 
informed segment of the population where support for the EU falls the most when 
public discussion of European integration is pitched in terms of risk (De Vreese and 
Kandyla, 2009). Hawkins’ identifies a British debate in which right wing press 
coverage of the EU reflects ‘themes of separation and threat’ (Hawkins, 2012, p. 573), 
where UK interests are ‘excluded or marginalised’ or ‘undermined by EU 
integration’. Even in the left wing press, coverage is ‘reactive to an agenda set by the 
Eurosceptic discourse’ (Hawkins, 2012, p. 573). 
 
These different arguments regarding the role of the UK media each highlight a 
particular aspect of the British press to explain the uniqueness of Euroscepticism in 
the UK. While we do not seek to question the argument that the British press is 
Eurosceptic, or that the early 1990s were a key turning point for the UK–EU debate, 
we do question whether the rise of Euroscepticism can be traced to one event or one 
individual. We consider the relationship between the media, public opinion and 
agenda-setting in the UK to be more multi-dimensional than a simple linear causality. 
For example, although the Murdoch-owned News UK remains important, based on 
circulation figures for 2000–14, only one of the top five national newspapers (The 
Sun) is owned by News Corporation. The remainder (Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Telegraph, Express) are owned by a variety of publishers, all of which have their own 
political agendas. News UK is therefore an important player within the UK media, but 
to ascribe absolute political agency to it and its owner, is to draw a simplified 
connection between rising Euroscepticism and a single source. The logic of such an 
argument has striking similarities with the EU–UK debate itself: a foreigner (Rupert 
Murdoch is Australian and American) controlling a domestic political issue (the EU–
UK relationship) and imposing its will against which the UK is powerless to resist. If 
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Murdoch’s interests are commercial (which seems a reasonable supposition for a 
hugely successful businessman), then his prime motivation is selling newspapers or 
subscriptions to his television channels. The best means of doing so is to give the 
public the kinds of stories that they like. Although European politics has seldom been 
an issue in which the British public displayed a passionate interest (Copsey and 
Haughton, 2014), newspaper readers do have a deep attachment to a good story, the 
revelation of cover-ups, and for sensationalism in general. Whilst a not otherwise 
particularly interesting set of potential headlines about Europe (‘new regulations for 
pleasure craft agreed’ say) has been exchanged for sensationalism (‘Brussels to ban 
square gin bottles’), this is a trend that is not exclusively linked to European affairs in 
UK Media (‘Cancer chemicals are found in eggs’, ‘Does eating eggs make you 
generous?’ etc.). 
 
News UK could, of course, exert its power as the ‘pace-setter’ of media reporting on 
the European issue, as well as numerous other topics. The logic here is that the taking 
of a position on the EU by the UK’s largest selling newspaper, The Sun, forces its 
competitors to adopt a similar tone in an attempt to boost their own circulation 
figures. There may be some merit in this argument, but it is important not to overstate 
the claim and thereby revert back to attributing the rise of British Euroscepticism to 
the actions of News UK. For example, The Sun was traditionally considered to be the 
most important newspaper for determining the outcome of a UK general election (it 
took credit, for example, for the 1992 result with the headline ‘It’s the Sun wot won 
it’ – although this was rather overblown). Its support for one of the major parties 
during an election campaign was seen as essential for any party hoping to gain office. 
However, during an election campaign different national newspapers have not 
followed the position taken by The Sun; rather they each support a political party that 
corresponds to their position within the UK’s political space and therefore their 
readership. This also means that the parties they support change over time (Wring and 
Deacon, 2010).  
 
The latter points to the political position of the UK national newspapers that can be 
situated within a two dimensional axis: they divide along the traditional left–right 
political spectrum, as well as a broadsheet–tabloid axis. The latter axis is particularly 
important given that in the UK tabloid newspapers are perceived to be more populist 
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relative to the broadsheets that target the middle classes and are read by the political 
elite. In this respect, the political landscape of the British press is more diverse than 
the picture of simply being dominated by News UK suggests. In the context of the 
UK, what is particularly important is its domination by what Hawkins (2012) refers to 
as the Eurosceptic right-wing press (RWP). This includes News UK’s The Sun and 
The Times, but also the Daily Mail, The Express and the Daily Telegraph. A more 
balanced opinion is given in the left-wing press (LWP) newspapers of The Guardian, 
The Observer and The Mirror. Reporting in the LWP challenges the Eurosceptic 
narrative, but despite positive coverage of the EU, a Eurosceptic discourse is also 
present. Furthermore, whilst pro-European voices are almost completely excluded 
from the RWP, space is afforded in these pro-European titles to overtly Eurosceptic 
voices. Thus, while the LWP offers a more balanced and less uniform account of the 
EU, it demonstrates the wider influence of the Eurosceptic discourse (Hawkins 2012).      
 
While media reporting of an event or topic is hugely important, it is situated within 
the structural context of public opinion. Public opinion polls have demonstrated the 
UK’s indifference towards EU membership (up to about 60 per cent of voters have no 
interest in the matter, Copsey & Haughton, 2014, p. 77). The British media therefore 
finds itself in an environment whereby it can either exploit that ambivalent position 
by taking a purely Eurosceptic tone found within the RWP, or as is done in the LWP, 
negotiate the tricky balancing act between supporting EU membership, but 
circumvent support by some critical engagement. Whether media coverage is 
considered as a cause of public opinion (i.e. the media leading the public) or a 
consequence (i.e. the public leading the media) is not important and impossible to 
delineate. What is important is that political actors believe that broadcast media 
(especially television) and newspapers determine the issue priorities of the public 
(Newton 2006). Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) argue that the most important reason 
for political actors to adopt media issues is that media coverage is associated with 
public opinion. Therefore political actors consider the issue attention of the media as 
an indicator of the needs and wishes of the public. It is a perfectly natural reaction for 
politicians to take up media causes and to follow the media’s prompting in some 
instances. Political actors are evaluated by the public based on the issues put forward 
by the media (Iyengar and Reeves, 1997). Not reacting to issues (widely) covered in 
the media might be considered as incapacity or, even worse, indifference. As a result, 
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politicians tend to take up causes championed by the media, as demonstrated by 
David Cameron’s need to ‘say something about Europe’.  
 
I.I. The Triangular Relationship 
 
DIAGRAM I TO BE INSERTED HERE 
 
 
However, while the relationship between the media and public opinion is important, it 
is one that both forms, and is formed by, national politics. In other words, politicians 
do not simply respond to cues in the media in the pluralist tradition; they are capable 
of shaping and determining the debate within the media, as well as influencing public 
opinion. Politicians use the media to gauge public reaction to their ideas and policy 
proposals (Davis 2007; Hefferman 2006). For example, in the build-up to an election 
campaign politicians will openly discuss ideas and policies in the media before 
formally releasing their election manifesto. The purpose here is to ‘test’ the public’s 
reaction to a proposal and to ascertain the policies for which there is maximum 
support. Some of these policies will build on the institutional constraints of a polity, 
but others could represent a new way of thinking, such as that demonstrated after 
Margaret Thatcher’s historic break with the post-war Keynesian approach to 
economic management. 
 
The media/national politics/public opinion nexus provides an insight into the complex 
relationships between the three spheres that underpin a national political debate or 
policy area. We cannot assume causality in any direction, rather the purpose of 
research is to analyse the complex and dynamic relationship between the three 
spheres of the nexus, which at a particular moment in time will give rise to the 
contours of a political debate. Changes in one component can have important 
consequences for the other two: for example, the political agency demonstrated by 
Thatcherism to reform the British economy and to redefine the boundaries of the 
modern state. However, change in one component can also be more broadly limited 
by the other two spheres, such as Tony Blair’s desire to forge a more positive 
relationship with the EU than the Major government through the Step Change 
programme (Bulmer and Burch, 2005), only to encounter resistance repeatedly from 
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both the media and public opinion (Oppermann, 2008). Exogenous factors may also 
impact on this nexus, as was the case when The Sun began to take a noticeably more 
Eurosceptic line in response to Commission President Jacques Delors setting out his 
vision of a federal Europe (Wilkes and Wring, 1998, p. 197). Our first task is 
therefore to set out how the British press covers the European issue. Once this is 
completed, we turn to the second part of the research puzzle, which is concerned with 
applying this new evidence to the triangular relationship between the media, the 
political agenda and public opinion.  
 
II. Research Methodology for Analysing the EU in the British Press between the 
mid-1970s and the mid-2010s 
 
Our empirical analysis is focused solely on newspapers. The justification for this is 
four-fold. First of all, and most importantly, for a longitudinal analysis such as this, 
newspapers offer the most complete source of data for studying trends over a 40-year 
time period. Second, due to their in-depth and complete coverage, newspapers are 
more likely to be able to affect policy-makers than are other media sources (Walgrave 
and Van Aelst, 2006). Despite declining print circulation, the print media continue to 
be of enormous significance both politically and within the broader societal debates. 
As Wring and Deacon (2010) note, their combined readership is equal to the number 
of viewers of the first-ever televised debate between political leaders in a UK General 
Election. Their power also lies in their ability to cultivate readers over the medium- 
and long-term. Moreover, the Broadcasting Code requires broadcast media to report 
with due impartiality. These rules do not apply to print media. Third, politicians 
themselves, due to the more flexible and easier processing of paper material, are 
personally more exposed to newspapers than to television news and, hence, at least 
historically, have been more affected by newspapers than television (Fuchs and 
Pfetsch 1996). Fourth, the UK has traditionally had a much larger level of newspaper 
circulation than other countries (though this, of course, has undergone considerable 
change in recent years as print media decline). Nonetheless, according to the OECD 
(2010, p. 17), in the late 2000s, the UK had the third largest newspaper market in the 
world behind only the USA and Japan (it was also twice the size of that of Italy and 
three times the size of France – a considerable difference given that these two 
countries have comparable populations to that of the UK).  
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In order to analyse the portrayal of the EU by UK newspapers three crucial 
methodological issues needed to be addressed: first, which newspapers to include in 
the analysis; second, the time period of the analysis; and third, how to categorise the 
reporting of the EU. These issues are addressed as follows. To gain an accurate 
sample of reporting from across UK newspapers we chose five national newspapers 
based on circulation figures provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations and their 
position within the two-dimensional space mentioned above i.e. left versus right, and 
tabloid versus broadsheet. We therefore selected the Daily Mirror (centre-left 
tabloid); the Daily Mail (centre-right tabloid); the Guardian (centre-left broadsheet); 
the Times (centre-right broadsheet); and the Financial Times (a centre-right 
broadsheet commonly thought of as the most pro-EU British newspaper and which is 
singularly important in shaping elite perceptions – some 53% of its UK readers are in 
the AB social class, and no less than 40% are London-based, Mori, 2004). We were 
unable to include The Sun newspaper as it does not maintain electronic records prior 
to 1996. While 84 per cent of the UK population claim to have read at least one 
newspaper over the last 12-month period, there are some important trends to note. 
First, while consuming digital content of news continues to increase, ‘traditional 
consumption (newspapers) still holds sway’. Second, younger generations are more 
likely to get their news from digital content, while older generations are more likely to 
read traditional print (YouGov 2013). Third, such a trend corresponds with support 
for the EU in that younger generations are more likely to hold positive views of EU 
membership, while older generations are more likely to hold negative views (YouGov 
2015). Such trends need to be balanced against the fact that older voters have a 
tendency to take part in elections and referendums.     
 
As we are interested in the changing dynamics of the EU within UK newspapers over 
time, our period of analysis needed to cover the UK’s accession in 1973 up to the time 
of writing in the mid-2010s. To do this, we chose specific two-year time periods for 
our focus, each of which correspond to periods of increased salience of the European 
issue in the British press. Each one of these two-year time periods covers a Treaty 
negotiation or high profile event in which there was significant media coverage. Such 
‘focusing events’ typically feature intense debates and reveal the fundamental 
divisions over the process of European integration, such as support for deeper 
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economic and political integration or broadening the scope of integration beyond the 
Single Market. It also enables the analysis to pinpoint if there is a particular EU event 
during which Euroscepticism was able to capture the domestic debate and set the 
agenda thereafter.  
 
Our analysis therefore focused on the following five time periods within the 
integration process: (1) 1974–75 during which the UK held a post-election 
referendum on membership; (2) 1985–86 during the negotiations and agreement of 
the Single European Act; (3) 1991–92 during negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty; 
(4) 2001–02 during negotiations on the Nice Treaty; and finally (5) 2012–13 around 
the time of David Cameron’s pledge to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU 
and hold an in-or-out referendum on membership.  
 
To identify the reporting of the EU in UK newspapers and its magnitude we 
constructed a coding framework. Constructing such a framework enabled the 
condensing of extensive qualitative data found (16,428 articles in the newspapers 
selected) within newspaper articles into smaller analysable units through the creation 
of categories and concepts derived from the data (Lockyer 2004). The framework 
constructed consists of three variables. The first categorises the main topic of the 
article, such as the Single Market, the Common Agricultural Policy, Economic and 
Monetary Union. To analyse the reporting of the EU we generated second (the 
portrayal of the EU, i.e. positive, negative, mixed, or factual) and third (magnitude, 
i.e. the degree of intensity with which a particular portrayal is made: high, medium or 
low) variables by initially analysing a cross-section of the articles. After constructing 
the framework it was applied to a pilot test and subsequently amended as necessary 
(see Gibbs, 2007, pp. 44–46). These categories are summarized in Tables I and II 
(available online). 
 
Newspaper articles for each of the five different two-year time periods were manually 
coded in accordance with the constructed framework. Owing to the historical nature 
of the research, we used the electronic archive databases of the individual 
newspapers, such as the Financial Times Historical Archive. To ensure that all articles 
were retrieved in the search we used a variety of search terms used to refer to the EU 
during a particular time period, such as European Economic Community, EEC, 
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European Communities, EC, Common Market, European Union and EU. We 
searched for articles in which the key search words were either in the headline/title or 
the first paragraph. This ensured that the search was limited to coding articles in 
which the EU features as the main topic. In databases where this is not possible, we 
searched entire articles and then manually sifted them for the criteria ourselves. The 
result is an extensive dataset of 16,428 entries that captures reporting of the EU in 
newspapers during specific high profile events since the UK membership in 1973.     
 
Finally, to reduce the level of subjectivity in the dataset and increase the consistency 
of the results, both authors were initially involved in the classification of the articles. 
Once we had established the coding framework, two research assistants coded the 
majority of the articles. To ensure that they were applying the framework in an 
identical way, they classified one newspaper separately, compared their results, and 
resolved any inconsistencies. They then took the lead on specific newspapers, 
consulted each other on articles that were difficult to classify, and cross-checked 
completed datasets.  
 
III. Research Findings: Continuity and Change in British Press Coverage of 
European Issues 
 
Taking into account the analysis of press coverage of the European issue by British 
newspapers, both continuity and change are apparent across the 40-year period. To 
begin with points of stability in coverage, it is striking that – taken in aggregate – the 
total volume of stories on the EU issue did not vary hugely across the period in the 
five newspapers surveyed. The total number of stories published about the EU was 
highest around the time of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in 1991–92, followed 
closely by the period of the first British referendum of 1974–75. Following these 
peaks, interest in the European issue seems to have waned gently, falling from around 
3500 to 3750 stories annually to a trough of 2500 thousand in the mid-1980s. When it 
comes to the particular spin placed on a given story, 50.7 per cent of coverage was 
factual in nature, and 10.7 per cent neutral. Of the remaining articles 17.8 per cent 
were positive and 20.8 per cent were negative, although there is variation within each 
particular timeframe. In 1974–75 positive reporting was 22.1 per cent, while negative 
reporting was 16.4 per cent; 1985–86 this shifted to 17.6 and 19 per cent; while 
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during 1991–92 such reporting was 18.1 per cent and 18.8 per cent. However, by 
2001–02 positive reporting had fallen to 13.9 per cent and negative reporting had 
increased to 22.7 percent, with the figures for 2012–13 16.3 per cent and 28.4 per 
cent. In sum, across the five newspapers surveyed over the 40-year timeframe, 79.2 
per cent of press coverage of the European issue could be described as factual, 
positive or neutral in nature. This is not entirely surprising given how pragmatic and 
cost–benefit oriented much of Britain’s attitude towards the EU has been.  
 
Figure I: The reporting of the EU by five UK newspapers for selected time 
periods (aggregate and percentage data).   
 
FIGURE I TO BE INSERTED HERE 
 
Source: Author’s own data. 
  
A number of politically important shifts can be observed between the mid-1980s and 
the mid-2010s once newspaper circulation is taken into account. Adjusted for the 
number of people who read the five newspapers in question, the outcome is rather 
different. We applied a weight to each of the articles based on the average daily 
circulation of their respective newspaper for each time period (figures obtained from 
the Audit Bureau of Circulations). This captures the typical exposure of each of the 
articles. To avoid distortions in the data between the different time periods caused by 
fluctuations in individual newspaper circulation, as well as an overall steady decline 
in print newspaper circulation, the results are captured as a percentage (figure III).  
 
Such analysis reveals that once readership is taken into consideration, factual articles 
average 42.1 per cent per cent of the total over the different time periods. Negative 
reporting has significantly increased from 24.2 (1974–75) to 44.9 (2012–13) and this 
has come at the expense of positive and neutral reporting. Positive coverage has fallen 
from 25.2 per cent in 1974–75 to 10.3 per cent in 2012–13. A closer analysis reveals 
that what took place over the period between the mid-1970s and the mid-2010s was 
that centre-right tabloid newspapers began to take a significantly increased interest in 
the dealings of the European Union, and as they did so, their coverage became 
steadily more negative. For 1985–86 negative reporting was 27.5 per cent, 29.7 per 
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cent for 1991–92, 34.1 per cent for 2001–02, and 44.9 per cent for 2012-13. By the 
mid-2010s almost all coverage of the European issue in the case of the Daily Mail (85 
per cent of articles) was negative. This was a remarkable shift from the position of the 
Daily Mail of the 1970s when 25 per cent of articles were positive (more than the 
negative proportion) and that of the 1980s and 1990s when less than half of total 
articles were negative in tone. Interestingly, on the broadsheet centre-right of the 
spectrum, represented by the Times and the Financial Times, no such shift took place. 
Total coverage of the European Union was either stable or falling over the 40-year 
period and such coverage as there was tended to be factual or more balanced between 
positive and negative.  
 
 
FIGURE II TO BE INSERTED HERE 
 
On the centre-left of the political spectrum, the picture is more complicated. The 
broadsheet centre-left Guardian remained solidly balanced in its reportage of the 
European issue between the mid-1970s and mid-2010s, with an even distribution of 
coverage split between positive, negative, neutral and factual. The tabloid Daily 
Mirror on the centre-left of the political spectrum showed an opposite trend to that of 
the centre-right Daily Mail. The Daily Mirror took relatively little interest in matters 
European throughout the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, and when it did so, it tended to 
be rather negative in its outlook. About a third of articles were negative in the mid-
1970s and a clear majority in the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. Yet after the 1990s, 
coverage of the European issue in the Daily Mirror increased three-fold by the mid-
2000s and then four-fold from the mid-1990s by the mid-2010s. The negative slant 
disappeared in favour of largely factual reporting, with, if anything, a positive stance.   
 
Before turning to the question of what this all means, one last piece of evidence needs 
to be marshalled: the data that deal with the magnitude with which a particular stance 
towards the European issue is taken in the British press. Broadly speaking, continuity 
here is more important than change from the mid-1970s onwards. Here we can see 
that articles with a negative slant on the European issue tend to be argued in a more 
forthright manner when compared to those with a positive angle. Pro-European 
articles were in general lukewarm in comparison with the fiery vituperation levelled 
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against the EU in many negative articles. A word of caution perhaps needs to be 
included in that newspaper coverage (indeed news in general) leans towards the 
gloomy (Miller and Albert, 2015). Bad news gets a greater prominence than good 
news and the European issue is no exception here. This finding supports that of 
Hawkins (2012) who argues that the negative reporting of the EU in the UK has a 
more damaging effect when combined with a lack of knowledge about the EU.    
 
FIGURE III TO BE INSERTED HERE. 
 
IV. Rethinking the Role of the Press in the Triangle of Politics, the Media and 
Public Opinion 
 
Looking across the data on newspaper coverage of the European issue, two 
conclusions may be drawn.  
 
First of all, in aggregate, British newspaper reporting on the European issue has been 
more straightforward than is commonly supposed. Much of it is just that: reporting. It 
tends to be generally rather factual and whilst a bias towards negative sentiments can 
be found, this bias is not particularly pronounced. It could be surmised that a very 
significant part of the electorate, particularly those reading broadsheet articles on the 
EU, therefore tend to view the European issue as being largely a question of a cost–
benefit analysis. At the very least, this is how the European issue is covered in the 
newspapers they read. Second, it needs to be borne in mind that the aggregate data are 
only one part of the story of UK press coverage on the EU. Taking into consideration 
newspaper circulation, the analysis reveals a shift in UK press coverage over a forty-
year period. While factual coverage has remained relatively constant, there has been 
an increase in negative reporting and this has come at the expense of articles that are 
either positive about the EU or neutral. This shift is mainly a result of changes in the 
nature of reporting by centre-right tabloids. Both the aggregate data and the weighted 
data suggest that the structural bias within the UK media cannot be traced to a 
particular issue or event where things suddenly become more entrenched towards the 
dominance of Euroscepticism. The early 1990s are important, but the weighted 
reporting of articles points to Euroscepticism being dominant during the 1980s, with 
27.5 per cent of coverage negative and 14.6 per cent positive. Exacerbating the 
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dominance of Euroscepticism in the UK is therefore not so much one particular event, 
such as Maastricht, or the agency exerted by an individual, such as Murdoch, but the 
absence of positive coverage across the rest of the press to counter such negative 
articles. The absence of such a counterweight to the negative publicity of the EU 
therefore explains the growing support for Euroscepticism over the last thirty years. 
While events such as the resignation of Thatcher, Maastricht, and the influence of 
News UK are important, their impact is amplified owing to the structural conditions 
of the UK. The same is also true for EU specific factors, such as those identified by 
Hooghe and Marks (2009), Kriesi (2006), and Mair (2007): when they interact with 
the UK polity, their effects are more noticeable than other EU Member States.          
 
What this points to is the phenomenon – for key elements of the electorate on the 
centre-right – of what has been termed ‘issue capture’ (Copsey & Haughton, 2014) 
where coverage of European Union matters is consistently and extensively cast in a 
negative light. Issue capture refers to the way in which a given political debate can be 
‘occupied’ and ‘dominated’ by a minority group with deeply-held strong views on a 
given political issue. The British debate on Europe is certainly not ‘owned’ by a 
particular party or even set of parties, but the terms of the debate are determined by 
the vocal Eurosceptic minority in the UK. What matters is that from the point that 
issue capture occurs, the terms of the political debate become set by the vocal 
minority until such time as the issue in question can be ‘recaptured’ by the political 
mainstream. The data on the magnitude of the slant in the newspaper articles given by 
negative stories is grist to this mill. The diet of exclusively negative articles about the 
European Union, strongly expressed and argued, that is fed to some elements of the 
newspaper reading public on the tabloid centre-right is characteristic of the British 
press.  
 
Eurobarometer polling has tracked British attitudes towards the EU over the same 
timeframe as our dataset (1973–2014). The conclusion that can be drawn from the 
polls is that the vast majority of voters do not have fixed views about the European 
Union, and for the most part, it is seldom an issue that is uppermost on their agenda of 
political priorities. The hard core of implacable Eurosceptic voters amounted to just 
12 per cent of those polled over the long-term, with the equivalent figure of support 
for the EU ran at 25 per cent of those polled. This ambiguity towards the European 
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Union that is felt by the great majority is very well reflected in the nature of the 
reporting in the dataset we compiled. The data for individual tabloid newspapers tell a 
slightly different story. In the case of the centre-left tabloid Daily Mirror, coverage of 
the European issue seems to have tracked the opinion of its core readership (working 
Labour party supporters), converting away from Euroscepticism towards Europhilia 
from the 1990s onwards. However, the recent decline in coverage of the EU issue in 
the Daily Mirror could be seen as an attempt to straddle the spilt in its readership, as 
some traditional working class Labour supporters have defected to UKIP (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014). The centre-right tabloid Daily Mail is different: although it reflected 
the combination of cautious support and ambivalence towards the European issue 
until the time of the Maastricht Treaty, following this period, even during its period of 
support for Tony Blair’s pro-European New Labour party in the late 1990s, it did not 
shift its editorial stance – quite the reverse, it was during this period that it became 
fully Eurosceptic.  
 
Yet what is interesting here, perhaps, is that the political debate (if not the media 
debate) is so influenced, or even dominated, by the noisy minority. Part of the answer 
to this question is to be found in the lack of passion with which the pro-European 
cause is made. It is the absence of this faction that gives the impression that the UK is 
more Eurosceptic than it truly is, and, at the same time that deprives the political 
debate about the EU of balance in that there are no real proponents or defenders of the 
EU to be found. 
 
Within a debate that has such unusual dimensions, it should come as no surprise that 
there are so few politicians really willing to talk about the European Union in positive 
tones and, comparatively, if not in absolute numbers, so many politicians willing to 
talk about it a negative way. On this particular political stage, the Eurosceptic has a 
small but motivated and supportive audience who are likely to agree with him/her. 
The Europhile, on the other hand, is trying to communicate with an indifferent (albeit 
very large) segment of the electorate who are unlikely to be listening. Given the 
symbiotic relationship between politicians, the media and public opinion in the UK, it 
is insufficient for just one of these three elements to attempt shift; the pull of the other 
two will soon draw it back into a clearly delimited space.   
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Thus in sketching the contours of the UK debate about the European Union, we see a 
political landscape that is both polarised as well as unbalanced. The polarisation is 
striking not because one sees an even split between Europhiles and Eurosceptics but 
because there are few Europhiles to match the Eurosceptics. British newspapers 
reflect this trend and, in our view at least, the tendency towards support for 
Euroscepticism in British newspapers is more a symptom of this polarisation than its 
cause. Ultimately, running negative articles about the EU sells newspapers. And the 
Eurosceptic press is not the main reason that explains why the UK’s relationship with 
the European Union remains so difficult.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This article re-examined the relationship between the media, politicians and public 
opinion in determining British attitudes towards the European Union. It challenged 
two assumptions in the current literature: first, that the press is the main driver behind 
British Euroscepticism and that one newspaper proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, plays the 
lead role in setting the terms of the UK’s EU debate; and second, that UK 
Euroscepticism crystallised during the early 1990s. We argued that the relationship 
between the media, national politics and public opinion is symbiotic. We therefore 
began our analysis of the ‘European issue’ in the UK from this assumption, rather 
than the supposition that one aspect of the relationship is the determinant of the other 
two. We complied an extensive dataset spanning 40 years and 16428 coded entries 
that provide the fullest available picture of British attitudes towards the European 
Union as reflected in the print media. We contextualised the evidence presented in our 
dataset with that on public opinion and developments in UK national politics. 
 
The evidence put forward in this article points to a British debate about the European 
Union that is both unbalanced and stuck – but not for the reasons that are usually put 
forward. Newspapers and the voters that read them are divided between an indifferent 
cost–benefit motivated majority for whom the European Union is a matter of rational 
choice on the one hand; and, a noisy and angry minority element within society for 
whom almost anything to do with the European Union must be exclusively negative, 
on the other. In general, the British press (not only broadsheets but some tabloids as 
well) tends to cater for the indifferent majority rather than the noisy minority, 
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although some of the right-wing press has become exclusively Eurosceptic over the 
last two decades. The absence of a counterweight of Europhiles that can positively 
argue the case for European integration has enabled ‘issue capture’ by a Eurosceptic 
minority in political debates on the EU. As a consequence, politicians have found 
themselves constrained by the structural dynamics of the issue: indifference to the EU 
is safer than being perceived as a Europhile by the electorate. Politicians that call for a 
more integrationist approach towards the EU are at best unrewarded by the electorate, 
or at worst punished.     
 
The newspaper dataset specifically focused on high-profile EU events to see if the 
growth of Euroscepticism can be traced to a particular event. One important 
observation from our research is that the newspaper dataset and Eurobarometer data 
suggest that there is no ‘tipping point’ for the growth of Euroscepticism in the UK.  
 
Fontana and Parsons (2015) refer to the destructive effects of the UK–EU relationship 
in the early 1990s, but evidence from this paper suggests otherwise. Since 1974–75 
there has been a decline in positive reporting about the EU in the press and an 
increase in the number of articles taking a more negative position, but clearly this 
cannot be traced to one particular event in the UK–EU relationship. The early 1990s 
debate on Maastricht acted as a focusing event, in which for a period the UK–EU 
debate had a high political salience, but there was no significant jump in negative 
reporting between the early 1990s and 2001–02. The time between 2001–02 and 
David Cameron’s announcement of a referendum on UK membership is noticeable 
for the increase in negative reporting, but again it would be difficult to claim that this 
represented a ‘tipping point’ in the debate.  
 
Our findings allow for reflection on the conditions under which issue capture can 
occur. While a vocal minority that is able to commandeer support in the press and the 
political mainstream in pursuit of a particular cause may be a necessary condition for 
the emergence of issue capture, alone it is insufficient. More important for issue 
capture is the absence of effective opposition to that vocal minority. Why a Europhile 
opposition has not emerged in the UK is a complicated question that goes beyond the 
scope of this article. But it suggests a failure on the part of the political elite to 
address and sustain a debate surrounding the complexities of European integration 
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adequately. The 2016 referendum campaign and its outcome could be seen as a 
symptom of this. 
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Diagram I:  
 
 
Figure I: The reporting of the EU by five UK newspapers for selected time periods (aggregate 
and percentage data).   
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Figure II: The reporting of the EU by five UK newspapers for selected time periods adjusted for 
by average daily circulation 
 
 
 
 
Figure III: The magnitude of both positive and negative reporting in UK newspapers for selected 
time periods (as a percentage) 
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Table I: Coding Framework for Portrayal of the EU in Newspaper Articles 
 
Coding Descriptor 
Positive Supportive of current developments within the process of European integration and the 
UK being a member.  It is a good thing that the UK is in the EU or the EU brings benefits 
to the UK or other countries or the Continent or certain groups of individuals. Such 
positive expressions are to be also found within the opinion of the journalist, or in the 
quotes given by individuals used within the article, or the factual evidence.    
Negative Expresses concern and/or dissatisfaction with current developments in the EU and/or the 
UK’s position as a member state. The EU or the UK’s Membership of the EU creates 
problems for the UK, other Member States or the Continent. The impact of the EU is 
negative. Such negative expressions are to be also found within the opinion of the 
journalist, or in the quotes given by individuals used within the article.   
Mixed  Expresses both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with either the process of European 
integration and/or the UK’s position as a member or for certain groups of individuals.  
Factual Article is factual and presents events in a fair and unbiased way allowing the reader to 
gain information on the EU, and the UK’s relationship with the EU, without it being 
tainted by the opinions of the newspaper. 
 
 
Table II: Coding Framework for the Magnitude of Positive or Negative Portrayal of the EU in 
Newspaper Articles 
 
Magnitude Definition  
Positive   
High The process of European integration should go further/deeper. Membership of the 
EU is a good thing. 
Medium Overall the process of European integration is positive, but there is no call for the 
process to go further. 
Low  Overall the process of European integration is positive, but it can be improved.  
Negative   
High The UK should leave the EU. 
Medium  In part, the EU creates problems or is responsible for problems in the UK. 
Low  The direction of integration is broadly negative and should be reformed.  
 
